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Abstract
In many social computing applications such as online Q&A forums, the best contribution for
each task receives some high reward, while all remaining contributions receive an identical, lower
reward irrespective of their actual qualities. Suppose a mechanism designer (site owner) wishes to
optimize an objective that is some function of the number and qualities of received contributions.
When potential contributors are strategic agents, who decide whether to contribute or not to
selfishly maximize their own utilities, is such a “best contribution” mechanism, MB, adequate
to implement an outcome that is optimal for the mechanism designer?
We first show that in settings where a contribution’s value is determined primarily by an
agent’s expertise, and agents only strategically choose whether to contribute or not, contests
can implement optimal outcomes: for any reasonable objective, the rewards for the best and
remaining contributions in MB can always be chosen so that the outcome in the unique sym-
metric equilibrium of MB maximizes the mechanism designer’s utility. We also show how the
mechanism designer can learn these optimal rewards when she does not know the parameters
of the agents’ utilities, as might be the case in practice. We next consider settings where a con-
tribution’s value depends on both the contributor’s expertise as well as her effort, and agents
endogenously choose how much effort to exert in addition to deciding whether to contribute.
Here, we show that optimal outcomes can never be implemented by contests if the system can
rank the qualities of contributions perfectly. However, if there is noise in the contributions’
rankings, then the mechanism designer can again induce agents to follow strategies that maxi-
mize his utility. Thus imperfect rankings can actually help achieve implementability of optimal
outcomes when effort is endogenous and influences quality.
1 Introduction
Social computing systems where web users generate online content and create value in exchange
for virutal rewards are now ubiquitous on the Web. In particular, there is an increasing number
of online knowledge-sharing forums like Yahoo! Answers, Quora, StackOverflow, as well as non–
English language forums like Naver (Korean) and Baidu Knows (Chinese), where users address or
solve questions posed by other users. A number of these forums, such as Yahoo! Answers, MSN
QnA, and Rediff Q&A, to name a few, are structured as a contest, where a contribution judged
to be the best answer receives extra virtual points compared to the remaining answers, and users
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compete with each other to provide the best answer and collect these virtual points1. However,
how good this best contribution is will depend on which users choose to enter and contribute an
answer in response to the incentives provided by the system, since entry is endogenous, i.e., a user
may choose to simply not participate in the system. In addition, viewers may also derive value
from contributions other than the one judged to be best answer— for instance, in Q&A sites like
Yahoo! Answers, there are questions (such as what to do over a weekend in New York) that may
not have a single objective answer, and more than one answer may provide value.
Is a contest the ‘right’ structure for eliciting desirable outcomes in such Q&A forums, in the
presence of strategic participants acting selfishly to maximize their own utility? In this paper, we
address this question from a game-theoretic perspective. Users with varying abilities have a cost
to answer a question or complete a task, and the quality, or value, of their output, is a function
of their ability and possibly the effort they expend. A mechanism in this setting specifies how to
reward agents for their contributions: for example, a contest or “best contribution” mechanism
would assign some high reward of pB points to the winner and a lower reward of pC ∈ [0, pB)
points to all other contributors, while an alternative mechanism may split a total prize P amongst
participants in proportion to the quality of their contributions.
In such a scenario, the realized outcome— the number and qualities of elicited contributions—
depends on the strategic choices of agents responding to the incentives provided by the mechanism.
Suppose the mechanism designer (i.e., the owner of the site) can quantify the desirability of each
such outcome, via some function of the number and qualities of the elicited contributions. Is
it possible, for any choice of mechanism at all, to support an outcome that is optimal for the
mechanism designer in an equilibrium of the corresponding game? And more specifically, is the
simple best contribution mechanism,MB , with only two parameters pB and pC to vary, adequately
powerful to implement an optimal outcome?
Our Contributions. We present a model (§2) to address the question of whether contests,
modeled as best contribution mechanismsMB, are adequate to implement optimal outcomes in the
presence of strategic contributors. We address this question for two types of situations that arise
in online Q&A forums, depending on whether the value of a contribution comes primarily from the
contributors’ ability, as in expertise-based questions, or whether it is a function both of the agent’s
ability and her endogenously chosen effort, as in research-intensive or thought-intensive questions.
Our results hold for a fairly general class of utility functions V of the mechanism designer, as well
as with general amounts of noise or error in the rankings of the contributions by the mechanism:
we only require that V is increasing in quality for any fixed number of contributions, and that the
ranking function is such that an agent’s probability of winning increases with the quality of her
contribution.
We first consider a model where agents with heterogeneous abilities strategically choose only
whether or not to contribute, modeling settings where an agent’s expertise rather than effort primar-
ily determines the value of her contribution. Our main result for this model shows that surprisingly,
best contribution mechanisms are indeed adequately powerful to implement optimal outcomes for a
broad class of objectives V— the rewards for the winning and remaining contributions can always
be chosen so that contributors follow strategies maximizing the mechanism designer’s utility in the
unique symmetric equilibrium. The values of these optimal rewards can be learned by the mecha-
1Virtual rewards indeed seem to be a strong incentive for users of online systems: [13], [15], and [16] all present
evidence that virtual points tend to motivate contributions from users.
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nism designer when she does not know the parameters of the agents’ utilities, as might be the case
in practice. We next address the question of whether there exist asymmetric equilibria, and prove
by construction that suboptimal asymmetric equilibria can indeed exist. However, this negative
result is not limited to best contribution mechanisms, and can be extended to a more general class
of mechanisms— the optimal outcome need not be the unique equilibrium for general rank-order
mechanisms if asymmetric equilibria are considered as well.
We then consider endogenous effort settings where the value of an agent’s contribution is a
function both of her ability and effort, and agents strategically choose both whether or not to par-
ticipate as well as how much effort they expend on their contributions. We first show that in this
setting, optimal outcomes cannot be implemented if the system ranks the qualities of the contribu-
tions perfectly— agents never all follow strategies that maximize the mechanism designer’s utility
in any equilibrium of the game. However, these adverse incentives can be avoided if the system
does not rank contributions perfectly— the mechanism designer may then again be able to choose
the rewards in the best contribution mechanism so as to implement the optimal outcome. Thus
when effort is endogenous and influences quality, it can actually be beneficial for the mechanism
designer to use noisy rankings in order to achieve implementability of optimal outcomes.
1.1 Related Work
There has been some prior work on the design of incentives for online Q&A forums [6], addressing the
issue of delayed responses. [6] studies the problem of designing incentives for users to contribute
their answers quickly, rather than waiting to make their contributions; it does not distinguish
between the qualities of responses provided by different participants. Our work relates more closely
to that on the optimal design of crowdsourcing contests ([1], [5], [8]), as well as a large body of work
in the economics literature on the design of contests to optimally incentivize participants ([3], [7],
[9], [10], [11], [12], [14]). The key differences between all these papers and our work are the following.
First, we consider an environment with virtual points which are, to a first-order approximation,
costless to the mechanism designer, whereas these papers all consider settings where the mechanism
designer pays real money to agents, and consequently the size of these payments has a direct effect
on the mechanism designer’s utility. Second, this literature addresses the question of what are
the best outcomes that can be supported in equilibrium, i.e., the question of optimizing amongst
implementable outcomes, rather than whether the optimal outcome, assuming nonstrategic agents,
is implementable by any mechanism in the presence of strategic agents. Finally, we study a model
with endogenous entry, i.e., agents can strategically decide whether or not to participate, and also,
we allow the mechanism designer’s utility to depend in a general way on number and qualities of
contributions, in contrast to specific objectives like maximizing the highest effort or the sum of the
top k efforts for some fixed k (see §2 for a motivation of more general utilities).
The work most closely related to ours from the crowdsourcing contest design literature is that of
[1], which considers a game-theoretic model of a crowdsourcing contest and asks how to optimally
split a prize budget amongst contestants to achieve the maximum equilibrium effort. In contrast,
we ask whether a mechanism designer can achieve an equilibrium outcome with utility equal to the
maximum possible utility achievable with nonstrategic agents, rather than how to optimize over the
set of implementable outcomes. [5] models crowdsourcing as an all-pay auction, where all agents
pay a cost to exert effort, but only one winner obtains the benefit from winning the auction, and
addresses the question of how to design an all-pay auction to maximize the highest effort, in contrast
with the conventional objective of maximizing revenue, or total effort. In contrast, we ask whether
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the family of contest-style mechanisms is powerful enough to optimize the mechanism designer’s
objective and how payoffs must be structured to incentivize this desired optimal behavior.
The economics literature on how firms can use contests to create incentives for employees to
work hard ([3], [7], [9], [10], [12]) again addresses questions related to using real money to optimize
amongst a set of implementable outcomes, and does not address whether a mechanism designer can
achieve her most preferred outcome over all possible outcomes in a setting with virtual rewards.
Also, this body of work typically assumes a specific functional form for the mechanism designer’s
utility, and does not address how endogenous participation may affect this utility.
2 Model
There are n potential contributors, or agents, i = 1, . . . , n, who strategically make contribution
choices in a single question or task in an online Q&A forum. Different agents have different
abilities, or levels of expertise for any given question or task. We denote the ability of an agent i
as ai; an agent who is more capable has a higher value of ai than a less capable agent.
The abilities ai are independent and identically distributed draws from a distribution with CDF
F . We assume that F is atomless and strictly increasing on its support, which we assume without
loss of generality is the bounded interval [0, 1]. An agent knows her own ability ai but not the
abilities aj drawn by the remaining agents; the distribution F , however, is common knowledge to
all parties.
The quality of the contribution produced by an agent i, which we denote by qi, is a non-
decreasing function of her ability ai, as well as possibly the effort ei she puts in, i.e., qi = qi(ai, ei).
We model two different kinds of situations that arise in online Q&A forums. In some settings
such as knowledge-based Q&A forums, agents possess differing amounts of knowledge about a
question and further knowledge is not easily obtainable— here the quality, or the value provided
by the contribution is determined largely by the expertise of the contributor rather than her effort,
and the cost to answering is only the effort of transcribing this knowledge. However, there are
also settings where a contributor might be able to significantly increase the quality or value of
her contribution with additional effort, for instance on questions on sites like StackOverflow which
might request code to accomplish some task. Here, the quality of a contribution depends both on
the contributor’s expertise and effort. We model these two different settings via the homogenous
and endogenous effort models below.
1. Homogenous effort: In the homogenous effort model, every agent incurs the same effort e and
pays the same cost cC if she chooses to make a contribution. The differences in the realized
qualities of contributions then arise solely from the differences in agents’ abilities. Without
loss of generality, we may write qi(ai, ei) = ai.
The homogenous effort model corresponds to a situation in which agents differ in the extent
to which they are able to answer a question, but it would take all individuals similar levels
of effort to actually contribute their knowledge as, for example, in the context of a question
on health in Yahoo! Answers.
2. Endogenous effort: In the endogenous effort model, each agent i can endogenously choose
to exert some level of effort ei ∈ [0, 1] if she decides to contribute. An agent who exerts
effort e pays a cost c(e), where c(e) is a continuously differentiable and increasing function of
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e. The final quality of an agent’s contribution, qi(ai, ei), is a continuously differentiable and
increasing function of the agent’s effort ei and her ability ai.
Note that agents are heterogeneous in both these models, as captured by their different abilities ai.
Actions. Agents in our model can strategically choose whether or not to contribute, as well as
how much effort to put in conditional on contributing in the endogenous effort model. In addition,
to fully capture the set of actions available to agents for gaining points on real Q&A forums such as
Y! Answers, we also allow agents to have the option of rating the received contributions: an agent
who decides to rate incurs a cost of cR ≥ 0
2. We emphasize, however, that all our results continue
to hold if agents do not have the option to rate, or do not receive points for rating.
Formally, each agent i strategically chooses an action αi ∈ {C,R,N}, where αi = C indicates
that agent i chooses to contribute, αi = R indicates that agent i rates (some nonempty subset of)
the received contributions, and αi = N indicates that agent i does not participate at all
3. In the
endogenous effort model, an agent who chooses to contribute (i.e., αi = C) can additionally choose
her level of effort ei ∈ [0, 1].
After agents strategically choose their actions, a mechanism allocates rewards in the form of
points to the agents. We denote the number of agents that decide to contribute by m. Let
α ≡ (α1, . . . , αn) denote the vector of action choices of the agents and q ≡ (q1, . . . , qm) denote the
vector of the qualities of received contributions. In general, an agent’s expected reward can depend
on her choice of action, the quality of her output if contributing, the actions of the other agents,
and the qualities and number of contributions produced by other agents. Let pi(α, q) denote the
expected number of points awarded to agent i by the mechanism. An agent’s expected payoff for
the game is equal to the expected number of points she obtains minus any costs associated with
her choice of action:
ui = pi(α, q)− c(αi),
where c(αi) denotes the cost agent i incurs from taking action αi. An agent who does not
participate, i.e., chooses αi = N , always receives no benefit and pays no cost, for a payoff of 0.
Mechanisms. There are many different ways to reward agents as a function of their actions.
For instance, a rank-order mechanism awards points to an agent based on how highly her con-
tribution ranks amongst all contributions (rather than its absolute quality), while a proportional
mechanism would award points in proportion to the realized qualities of the contributions. In
this paper, we will focus on the family of best contribution mechanisms MB, which choose a best
or ‘winning’ contribution and give the winner a higher reward than the other contributors. This
mechanism is of particular interest because it is widely used in many settings where extra points are
awarded for the ‘best’ user-generated contribution such as in MSN QnA, Rediff Q&A, and Yahoo!
Answers, as well as in crowdsourcing contests where the best submission receives a prize or award
(and the remaining submissions usually receive nothing).
Definition 2.1. The best contribution mechanism MB(pB , pC) selects some contribution as the
2Note that this cost cR is the total cost for rating, not the cost of rating an individual contribution. This
is reasonable because we do not reward agents for individual ratings either—agents are not required to rate all
contributions, nor to rate with high accuracy, to earn the reward for rating
3Since agents would not have an incentive to rate honestly if they were allowed to rate their own contributions,
we assume that an agent can choose to either contribute or rate contributions for a given question but not both; this
is in keeping with the practice on several websites such as Slashdot.
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best or winning contribution, and awards the corresponding contributor or winner pB > 0 points
and all remaining contributors pC ∈ [0, pB) points.
An agent who rates (any nonzero number of) contributions receives pR ≥ cR points, but an
agent receives no payoff from choosing the rating action if there are no contributions to rate. The
assumption that pR ≥ cR ensures that agents prefer to rate than to not participate at all. We note
here that a system which does not allow or reward rating is easily captured in our model by setting
pR = 0; identical results can be obtained with substantively identical proofs in this case where
pR ≤ cR and all agents weakly prefer not to participate than to rate.
Given a set of contributions, the best contribution mechanism MB needs to pick a winning
contribution. We use a function π to describe how the mechanism MB chooses a winner as a
function of the qualities of received contributions. Note that we do not require the mechanismMB
to be able to identify the highest quality contribution with perfect accuracy (in fact, as we will
see in §4, this might not even be desirable). Instead our results only require that higher quality
contributions are more likely to be chosen as winners.
Definition 2.2. We use π(qi, q−i,m) to denote the probability that an agent i with a contribution
of quality qi will be chosen as the winner when there are m other agents who produce contributions
with qualities q−i.
We make the following assumptions on π:
1. π(qi, q−i,m) is increasing in qi and decreasing in m. That is, agent i should be more likely to
win if she makes a higher quality contribution, and less likely to win if the number of other
contributors increases.
2. For any fixed values ofm and q∗i , the set of values of q−i for which π(qi, q−i,m) is discontinuous
in qi at qi = q
∗
i has measure zero.
Note that the ratings from the agents who choose to rate may or may not be used towards
determining the best contribution: as long as the agents rating content are more likely to rate
a higher quality contribution more highly, the probability π(qi, q−i,m) is likely to satisfy these
conditions.
Solution Concept. Throughout this paper, we use the solution concept of a Bayes-Nash
equilibrium, in which each player takes an action that maximizes her expected utility given the
strategies of the other agents and the unknown abilities of the other agents. This an appropriate
solution concept when an agent knows her own ability but not that of the other agents when
taking an action, as in our setting.
Mechanism Designer’s Objective. We suppose that the mechanism designer can quantify
the desirability of each possible outcome, specified by the number of contributors m and their
qualities, via some function V (m, q1, . . . , qm), where qi denotes the quality of the ith best contri-
bution. We will assume that the function V is continuous in (q1, . . . , qm) for all m, and that it is
nondecreasing in {q} for a given m. Such a utility function V is fairly general, capturing a wide
variety of possible preferences that a mechanism designer might have— the only requirement we
impose on V is that, for any fixed number of contributions m, the mechanism designer must prefer
higher quality contributions to lower quality ones.
6
Specifically, our condition on V allows for non-monotonicity in the number of contributions— a
larger number of contributions may not always be more valuable, so that, for example, the outcome
(q1, q2), might be preferred to the outcome (q1, q2, q3) even for large values of q3. Accommodating
such nonmonotonicity is important because it allows modeling situations where there is a cost to
searching for higher quality contributions, so that the mechanism designer may actually prefer to
limit the number of contributions to only those with adequately high quality. In addition, it also
allows capturing situations where a mechanism designer may value having multiple high quality
answers much more than he values each answer individually, such as when these answers reinforce
each other and increase the asker’s confidence that he is getting high quality advice that he can
act on. Such a utility function, where for example V (2, q, q′) > V (1, q) + V (1, q′), is not captured
by the standard objectives of highest or total quality.
3 Homogenous Effort
We begin with addressing the question of whether the parameters of the best contribution mech-
anism MB can always be chosen so as to implement optimal outcomes in the homogenous effort
model. In addition to capturing expertise-based settings where effort does not significantly affect
the value of a contribution, the equilibrium analysis in this simpler model serves as a useful building
block for the analysis in the endogenous effort model.
We first analyze the equilibria of the family of mechanismsMB in §3.1, and show that there is
a unique symmetric equilibrium in threshold strategies, where this threshold ability is a continuous,
monotone function of the rewards (pB, pC). Next we prove that as long as the mechanism designer’s
utility increases with quality (although not necessarily with participation), some symmetric thresh-
old strategy maximizes her utility as well. This, together with the continuity and monotonicity
properties of the equilibrium threshold, can be used to show that there exists a choice of rewards
that implements the optimal outcome (§3.2).
3.1 Equilibrium Analysis
We begin with the existence of a symmetric threshold strategy equilibrium.
Lemma 3.1 (Existence). For any values of pB and pC with pB > pC , there exists a symmetric
equilibrium in threshold strategies for the mechanism MB(pB , pC): there is a threshold a
∗(pB, pC)
such that it is an equilibrium for each agent i to contribute if and only if her ability ai ≥ a
∗(pB, pC).
Proof. First note that regardless of the strategies of the remaining agents, agent i has a unique best
response, which is a threshold strategy a∗i , where i contributes (i.e., chooses action C) if and only
if her ability ai ≥ a
∗
i . To see this, note that agent i’s expected payoff from rating is independent
of her ability ai, but her payoff from contributing is strictly increasing in her ability ai because her
probability of winning is strictly increasing in ai. Thus if agent i prefers contributing to rating at
ability ai, she must strictly prefer contributing to rating at all abilities a
′
i > ai. Similarly, if she
prefers rating to contributing at ability ai, she must also strictly prefer rating to contributing at
all abilities a′i < ai. Thus regardless of the strategies of the other agents, an agent i’s unique best
response is to use a threshold strategy a∗i in which the agent contributes if and only if ai ≥ a
∗
i .
It follows that an equilibrium in the related game in which agents are restricted to using thresh-
old strategies is also an equilibrium of the original game. But the game in which agents are restricted
7
to using threshold strategies is a symmetric game in which each agent has a set of possible actions
that is compact and Hausdorff and each agent’s expected utility is a continuous function of the
actions of the agents. Thus by Theorem 1 of [4], it follows that there exists a symmetric mixed
strategy equilibrium in the game in which agents are restricted to using threshold strategies. Now
since an agent has a unique best response to any strategy choices of the remaining agents, it follows
that the agents must not be randomizing over different thresholds in this equilibrium. Thus there
exists a symmetric threshold equilibrium in which all agents use the same threshold a∗.
For the remaining results in this section it will be useful to introduce the following notation.
Definition 3.1. [Pr(C>0|a, n), P r(W|a, n)] Recall that agents’ abilities qi are drawn from the dis-
tribution F . We let Pr(C>0|a, n) denote the probability that an agent sees at least one contribution
from the other agents when these remaining n−1 agents each use a threshold strategy with threshold
a. We let Pr(W|a, n) denote the probability that an agent with ability a ‘wins’, i.e., is chosen as
the best contribution, when the remaining n− 1 agents are using a threshold strategy with the same
threshold a. We drop the dependence on n when the value of n is fixed and clear from the context.
Note that Pr(C>0|a, n) = 1− F
n−1(a). If contributions are perfectly ranked according to their
qualities, then Pr(W|a, n) = Fn−1(a), since the only way an agent with ability ai = a can win
against other agents j who contribute according to the threshold a is if none of them contributes.
However, since we allow for the possibility that contributions are not ranked perfectly according to
their qualities, in general Pr(W|a, n) may be greater than Fn−1(a) under our model.
Now we prove that there is a unique symmetric equilibrium to MB(pB, pC).
Theorem 3.1 (Uniqueness). The mechanism MB(pB , pC) has a unique symmetric equilibrium.
Proof. Since any individually rational strategy is a threshold strategy, any equilibrium must be in
threshold strategies. Thus it suffices to show that there is a unique symmetric threshold strategy
equilibrium.
First note that since F is an atomless distribution, the probability Pr(C>0|a
∗) that another
agent contributes is strictly decreasing and continuous in a∗, and similarly Pr(W|a∗) is strictly
increasing in a∗ (because the agent faces less competition in the sense of first order stochastic
dominance when a∗ increases) and continuous in a∗ (because the random amount of competition
the agent faces varies continuously with a∗).
Therefore, the expected utility an agent obtains from choosing to rate when all agents play
according to a threshold strategy a∗,
uR(a∗) = (pR − cR)Pr(C>0|a
∗),
is nonincreasing and continuous in a∗, and the expected utility an agent i with ability ai = a
∗
obtains from contributing when all other agents are using a threshold strategy with threshold a∗,
uC(a∗) = (pB − cC)Pr(W|a
∗) + (pC − cC)[1 − Pr(W|a
∗)],
is strictly increasing and continuous in a∗.
Now if there is a value a∗ such that an agent with ability ai = a
∗ is indifferent between rating
and contributing when all other agents play according to the threshold a∗, i.e., if there is a solution
a∗ ∈ [0, 1] to the equation
uR(a∗) = uC(a∗),
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then this threshold a∗ constitutes an equilibrium. Since uR is nonincreasing in a∗ and uC is strictly
increasing in a∗, such a solution a∗, if it exists, is unique, and gives the unique symmetric equilibrium
to MB(pB , pC).
If there is no such a∗, then either uR(a∗) > uC(a∗) for all a∗ ∈ [0, 1] or uR(a∗) < uC(a∗) for all
a∗ ∈ [0, 1]. In the former case, the only equilibrium is for all agents to always rate (corresponding
to the threshold a∗ = 1), and in the latter case the only equilibrium is for all agents to always
contribute (corresponding to the threshold a∗ = 0). Therefore, in all of these cases there exists a
unique symmetric threshold equilibrium.
We note that if pC − cC > pR − cR, then an agent always prefers contributing to rating even if
she knows that she will not have the best contribution. Similarly, if pB − cC < 0, an agent always
prefers not to contribute even if she knows that she will have the best contribution. In these cases,
the symmetric threshold equilibrium will have thresholds a∗ = 0 and a∗ = 1 respectively. But in
intermediate cases, where
pC − cC < pR − cR < pB − cC ,
the symmetric threshold equilibrium must have a∗ ∈ (0, 1), so that agents neither always rate nor
always contribute.
Next we prove that the unique equilibrium threshold a∗(pB , pC) varies continuously with pB
and pC , which we use to prove the main implementation result in the next section. This result
guarantees that agents will not dramatically change the strategies they use as a result of small
changes in the rewards that the mechanism designer is using to incentivize the agents.
Theorem 3.2 (Continuity). The equilibrium threshold a∗(pB , pC) is continuous in pB and pC .
Proof. The equilibrium threshold a∗ is given by the unique solution, if it exists, to
u∆(pB, pC , a) ≡ (pR − cR)Pr(C>0|a)− (pB − cC)Pr(W|a) − (pC − cC)[1 − Pr(W|a)] = 0,
where Pr(C>0|a) and Pr(W|a) are as in Definition 3.1.
Note that if pB and pC change by an amount no greater than δ > 0, then u∆(pB , pC , a) changes
by an amount O(δ). If a increases (decreases) by ǫ, then Pr(C>0|a) decreases (increases) by Ω(ǫ
n−1)
and Pr(W|a) increases (decreases) by Ω(ǫn−1), meaning u∆(pB , pC , a) decreases (increases) by
Ω(ǫn−1). Thus for any ǫ > 0 there exists some δ > 0 such that if pB and pC change by an amount
no greater than δ, then the value of a that satisfies u∆(pB, pC , a) = 0 changes by an amount no
greater than ǫ. Thus the equilibrium threshold is continuous in pB and pC if there exists some a
satisfying u∆(pB , pC , a) = 0.
If there is no a satisfying u∆(pB, pC , a) = 0, then either all agents strictly prefer to rate when
all other agents are rating or all agents strictly prefer to contribute when all other agents are
contributing. Small changes in pB and pC would not affect these strict preferences, so it would
remain an equilibrium for all agents to rate or for all agents to contribute after small changes in
pB and pC . Thus the equilibrium threshold is also continuous in pB and pC when there does not
exist a a satisfying u∆(pB , pC , a) = 0.
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3.2 Implementability
Having characterized equilibrium strategies in the mechanismMB in the previous section, we now
prove the main implementation result for the homogenous effort model. We show that, regardless
of the precise form of the mechanism designer’s utility function V (m, q1, . . . , qm), the values of the
rewards pB and pC in the best contribution mechanismMB can always be chosen to induce agents
to follow strategies that maximize the mechanism designer’s expected utility.
The proof of this implementation result breaks down into two parts. First we show that for any
utility function V , E[V ] can be maximized by a threshold strategy aˆ in which each agent i chooses
to contribute if and only if ai ≥ aˆ. We then show that for any aˆ, pB and pC can always be chosen
such that agents use the threshold strategy aˆ in equilibrium in MB .
Throughout this section, we will restrict attention to symmetric strategies: specifically, the
strategy maximizing the mechanism designer’s expected utility is the optimal strategy amongst
symmetric strategies.
Lemma 3.2. There exists a threshold strategy, where each agent contributes if and only if her
quality is greater than a common threshold aˆ, that maximizes the mechanism designer’s expected
utility.
Proof. Suppose there exists some strategy σ such that the mechanism designer’s expected utility
E[V ] is maximized when all agents use the strategy σ. Let λ(σ) denote the probability (over
random draws of agents’ abilities from F and any randomness in σ) with which an agent contributes
when using the strategy σ. Consider the alternative threshold strategy aˆ(σ) whereby an agent i
contributes if and only if her ability ai ≥ aˆ(σ), where aˆ(σ) = F
−1(1 − λ(σ)) is chosen so that the
probability an agent contributes under this threshold strategy remains unchanged at λ(σ). Such a
aˆ always exists because F (a) is continuous in a on its support.
Now the mechanism designer’s expected utility E[V ] is at least as large when the agents use this
threshold strategy as it is when they use the strategy σ: to see this, note that the distribution of
the number of agents who contribute is the same regardless of whether agents use the strategy σ or
the threshold aˆ(σ). But conditional on contributing, an agent’s distribution of qualities under the
threshold strategy aˆ(σ) first order stochastically dominates this distribution under the strategy σ.
Since V is increasing in the quality of the contributions by assumption, the mechanism designer’s
expected utility when agents are using the threshold strategy aˆ(σ) is at least as large as that when
agents are using the strategy σ.
Therefore, there exists a (symmetric) strategy that maximizes E[V ] if and only if there exists a
threshold aˆ that maximizes E[V ] amongst the class of (symmetric) threshold strategies. But such
an optimal threshold always exists because E[V ] is continuous in aˆ and there is a compact set of
possible thresholds aˆ. The result then follows.
From Lemma 3.1 and Theorem 3.1, we know that agents use the threshold strategy a∗ in equi-
librium, and from Lemma 3.2, we know that the mechanism designer’s utility function is maximized
when agents use the threshold strategy aˆ. So to prove the implementation result, we only need to
show that these thresholds can be made to coincide. We now show that for any aˆ ∈ [0, 1], there
exists a choice of pB and pC such that the threshold a
∗(pB , pC) that agents use in equilibrium in
the mechanism MB(pB , pC) satisfies a
∗(pB , pC) = aˆ.
Theorem 3.3. For any pR and any fixed ratio of the rewards pB/pC > 1, there exist values of
pB and pC such that the unique symmetric threshold equilibrium of MB(pB , pC) maximizes the
mechanism designer’s expected utility.
Proof. Note that if pB − cC < 0 and pC − cC < 0, then the unique equilibrium is for all agents to
rate, i.e., a∗ = 1. If pB − cC > pC − cC > pR − cR, then the unique equilibrium is for all agents
to contribute, corresponding to the threshold a∗ = 0. Since a∗ is continuous in pB and pC (by
Lemma 3.2), it follows from the intermediate value theorem that there exist values of pB and pC
such that a∗(pB , pC) = aˆ for any value of aˆ ∈ [0, 1]. And since we know from Lemma 3.2 that the
mechanism designer’s expected utility can always be optimized by using a threshold strategy, the
result follows.
This result indicates that the commonly used best contribution mechanism is actually quite
powerful for inducing agents to follow strategies that are optimal for the mechanism designer when
the main difference between agents is how they differ in their levels of expertise. We note the
generality of this result: (i) it holds for arbitrary utility functions of the mechanism designer
(provided they depend only on the number and qualities of contributions) and (ii) it holds even
with general amounts of noise or errors in the rankings of the contributions; i.e., the probability
a contribution may be ranked best even if it is not the highest quality contribution can depend in
a very general way on the number and qualities of the contributions. Our implementation result
in this section continues to hold as long as V is increasing in quality and an agent’s probability of
winning increases with quality (i.e., higher quality contributions are more likely to win).
Next we illustrate how the mechanism designer would want to choose the values of pB and pC
in practice. First we show how the values of pB and pC that must be used to induce the optimal
outcome vary as a function of the number of agents, n. This is relevant because some types of
questions differ systematically in the numbers of agents that arrive. The following result is proven
and discussed in the appendix.
Proposition 3.1 (Comparative Statics). Suppose that the threshold the mechanism designer would
like the agents to use in equilibrium is independent of n. For any fixed pR and any fixed ratio
pB/pC > 1, the numbers of points the mechanism designer should award as a function of n, pB(n)
and pC(n), are strictly increasing in n.
Next we address how the mechanism designer can learn the values of agents’ utility functions
when the mechanism designer does not initially know how costly it is for agents to make contribu-
tions. In order to compute the values of the rewards pB and pC that implement optimal outcomes
in MB , the mechanism designer needs to know the values of the agents’ costs cC for making a
contribution, but these may not be known in practice. The following result, proven and discussed
in the appendix, shows how the mechanism designer can conduct a series of contests to learn the
cost of contributing if the cost of rating, cR, is known (a plausible assumption since this cost is
often close to zero).
Theorem 3.4. Suppose the mechanism designer conducts a series of T contests with n agents
in which the mechanism designer awards pB > pR + c points for winning and pC = 0 points for
contributing but not winning, and let ntC denote the number of agents who choose to contribute in
the tth contest. Then,
∑T
t=1 n
t
C/(Tn) converges in probability to an invertible function of cC as
T →∞.
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When cR is unknown, the mechanism designer can learn the values of cC and cR by conducting
two separate series of contests of the form in Theorem 3.4; we discuss the extension of this result
to cases where cR is unknown in the appendix.
Implementation for General Mechanisms We have seen that the mechanism MB , which
awards a strictly larger number of points to a single best contribution, and a flat number of
points to all remaining contributions, is a rather powerful mechanism in terms of creating optimal
incentives for agents. IsMB special in this regard, or does this implementation result hold for other
mechanisms as well? In fact, this result does hold for other mechanisms— the key property that
is needed for the implementation result is the monotonicity and continuity of an agent’s expected
payoff from contributing as a function of quality.
Consider a more general class of mechanisms where the expected reward an agent with quality
qi obtains from contributing when m other agents contribute with qualities q−i is some function
p(qi, q−i,m). Suppose that p(qi, q−i,m) is strictly increasing in qi and continuous in (qi, q−i). The
best contribution mechanismMB that we study is a special case of this general class of mechanisms,
but there are many other mechanisms with this property. For example, a mechanism in which the
highest ranked contribution receives p1 points, the contribution ranked second receives p2 < p1
points and so on, satisfies these criteria as long as the probability that agent i is ranked ahead
of agent j is increasing in qi and continuous in qi and qj. Another example is a proportional
mechanism in which p(qi, q−i,m) =
qi∑
j qj
(with appropriate values when qi = 0 for all i).
The implementation result in fact continues to hold for this more general class of mechanisms
as well. The proof is very similar to the argument for the best contribution mechanismMB in §3.1
and 3.2. Lemma 3.1, which guarantees existence of a symmetric threshold equilibrium, only relies
on the fact that an agent is more willing to contribute when she has a greater ability, which remains
true for this more general class of mechanisms, since an agent obtains more points in expectation
from contributing with greater ability. The continuity of the equilibrium threshold in the number
of points awarded, given in Theorem 3.2, will continue to hold because p(qi, q−i,m) is continuous
in (qi, q−i).
Given this, if the mechanism designer awards an expected number of points equal to
kp(qi, q−i,m) for some k > 0 chosen by the mechanism designer, k can be chosen to induce the
agents to follow a strategy that maximizes the mechanism designer’s expected utility: when k is
very small, then agents will never want to contribute, whereas when k is very large, agents will
always want to contribute. From the continuity of strategies in points, it then follows that by appro-
priately choosing an intermediate value of k, the mechanism designer can induce any intermediate
rates of contribution characterized by any threshold qˆ ∈ (0, 1).
3.3 Asymmetric Equilibria
The implementation result we proved in §3.2 guarantees uniqueness of the optimal outcome amongst
the set of symmetric equilibria— there exists a choice of pB and pC such that the unique symmetric
equilibrium of MB(pB , pC) consists of strategies that maximize the mechanism designer’s utility.
But what about asymmetric equilibria— can there exist other, asymmetric, equilibria in MB?
In this section, we show that the answer to this question, unfortunately, is yes. However, as
we show, this is not a difficulty only with the mechanism MB— asymmetric equilibria can arise
in a more general class of mechanisms as well, even with a general amount of noise or error in the
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rankings of the contributions. This indicates that, even for fairly general classes of mechanisms, it
is not possible to guarantee that the equilibrium maximizing E[V ] will be the unique equilibrium
of the game, if we also consider asymmetric equilibria.
We consider a general class of mechanisms in which an agent ranked first receives p1 points,
an agent ranked second receives p2 points, and in general the k-th ranked agent receives pk points.
These values of pk do not depend directly on the precise quality of any agent’s contribution but
instead depend only on the ordering of the contributions. We assume throughout that p1 ≥ p2 ≥
. . . ≥ pn and at least one of these inequalities is strict.
In order to allow for a wide range of accuracies with which contributions are ranked, we intro-
duce a parameter β ∈ [0, 1] which represents the extent to which the system is able to distinguish
contributions on the basis of their qualities. With probability β, the system is able to perfectly dis-
tinguish the qualities of the contributions and ranks a contribution i ahead of another contribution
j if and only if qi > qj . With probability 1 − β, the system is unable to distinguish the qualities
of any of the contributions, and simply orders them randomly. Larger values of β indicate that it
is more likely that the system will accurately order the contributions by quality. While this is not
the most general possible formulation, it suffices to illustrate our point.
Under this general class of mechanisms and general levels of system accuracy in ranking con-
tributions, there always exists the possibility of asymmetric equilibria, as shown by the following
result.
Theorem 3.5. For any values of pk and β, there exists an asymmetric equilibrium as long as it is
not an equilibrium for all agents to rate or for all agents to contribute.
Proof. We construct an equilibrium in which agent 1 always contributes (corresponding to the
threshold a∗1 = 0) and the remaining agents i = 2, . . . , n contribute according to a threshold
a∗i = a
∗ > 0. Note that by the assumptions on the distribution F , F (a∗) > 0 if a∗ > 0.
The expected payoff to agent 1 if she chooses to rate when all other agents use the threshold
strategy a∗ is
uR1 = (1− F (a
∗))n−1(pR − cR),
while the payoff to agents i ≥ 2 from rating, when all remaining agents play according to their
strategies a∗, is uRi = pR − cR. Note that u
R
i ≥ u
R
1
for i ≥ 2: this is because agent 1’s strategy is
to always contribute, which means that there is always content for the remaining agents to rate.
Now consider payoffs from contributing. If the system can perfectly distinguish the qualities of
the contributions, then the probability that an agent i finishes ahead of some particular other agent
when she draws a quality equal to her threshold (ai = a
∗
i ) is F (a
∗): if the other agent is j ≥ 2, i
wins only if the other agent does not participate, which has probability F (a∗); if the other agent
is j = 1, i wins if a1 ≤ a
∗
i = a
∗, which also has probability F (a∗). If the system cannot distinguish
qualities, and orders the contributions randomly, then the probability that an agent who contributes
finishes ahead of some particular other agent i ≥ 2 is F (a∗)+ 1
2
(1−F (a∗)) = 1
2
+ 1
2
F (a∗), while the
probability that an agent who contributes finishes ahead of agent 1 is 1
2
< 1
2
+ 1
2
F (a∗) for a∗ > 0.
Therefore, the distribution of the number of other agents that agent 1 beats, when she plays
according to this strategy and has ability equal to her threshold, strictly first order stochastically
dominates the distribution of the number of other agents than an agent i ≥ 2 beats when con-
tributing with ability equal to her threshold. This means that the expected payoff to agent 1 from
contributing at her threshold, uC1 (a
∗
1), is greater than the expected payoff u
C
i (a
∗) to other agents
i ≥ 2 from contributing at their threshold abilities.
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Combining the facts that uRi ≥ u
R
1
and uC
1
(a∗
1
) > uCi (a
∗), we see that if an agent i ≥ 2 is
indifferent between rating and contributing when her ability ai is equal to her threshold a
∗, then
agent 1 strictly prefers contributing to rating when she draws ability a1 = a
∗
1
. So if there is a value
of a∗ > 0 such that an agent i ≥ 2 is indifferent between rating and contributing at ability ai = a
∗
(given that the remaining agents play according to their thresholds a∗1 = 0 and a
∗
i = a
∗), we will
have
uC1 (a
∗
1) > u
C
i (a
∗) = uRi ≥ u
R
1 ,
in which case the threshold strategies a∗1 = 0 and a
∗
i = a
∗ constitute an (asymmetric) equilibrium.
To prove such a a∗ exists, note that we may assume that a∗1 = 0 and a
∗
i = a
∗ = 1 is not an
equilibrium, since otherwise we have already produced an asymmetric equilibrium as claimed. So
suppose that it is not an equilibrium for agents i ≥ 2 to use the threshold a∗i = 1 and agent 1 to
use a∗
1
= 0. We will show that a solution to uCi (a
∗) = uRi must exist for some a
∗ > 0.
For a∗ = 1, note that uCi (a
∗) > uRi . To see this, suppose by means of contradiction that
uCi (a
∗) ≤ uRi . Then none of the agents i = 2, . . . , n have any incentive to deviate under the
thresholds a∗1 = 0 and a
∗
i = 1. Since we assumed that these strategies do not constitute an
equilibrium and agents 2, . . . , n have no incentive to deviate, this means that agent 1 prefers to
deviate from contributing to rating when all other agents are rating. Thus p1 − cC ≤ 0, since the
expected payoff from rating when no other agent is contributing is 0. But when p1 − cC ≤ 0, it is
an equilibrium for all agents to rate, contradicting the assumption in the statement of the theorem.
So uCi (q
∗) > uRi must hold when a
∗ = 1.
Next note that if agents i ≥ 2 use the threshold a∗i = 0, so that all agents always contribute,
then an agent with ability equal to the threshold must strictly prefer to deviate by rating because
we have assumed that it is not an equilibrium for all agents to contribute content. Therefore,
uCi (a
∗) < uRi at a
∗ = 0.
Thus if w∆(a
∗) denotes the expected utility difference that an agent j ≥ 2 obtains from rating
rather than contributing when j has ability aj = a
∗ and all remaining agents are playing according
to their threshold strategies (a∗1 = 0 and a
∗
i = a
∗), then w∆(a
∗) > 0 when a∗ = 0 and w∆(a
∗) < 0
when a∗ = 1. But w∆(a
∗) is continuous in a∗, so by the intermediate value theorem, there exists
some a∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that w∆(a
∗) = 0. For this a∗, it is an equilibrium for agent 1 to always
contribute and agents i ≥ 2 to use the threshold strategy a∗. Thus an asymmetric equilibrium
exists.
This result indicates that while the mechanism designer can choose the rewards pB and pC in
MB so that there is an equilibrium in which E[V ] is maximized, it is not possible to ensure this is
the unique equilibrium when allowing for asymmetric equilibria. However, this negative result also
holds for a more general class of mechanisms: using more general rank-order mechanisms will not
help to strengthen the implementation result.
We note that the class of mechanisms for which we explicitly constructed asymmetric equilibria
is not the only class of mechanisms that is available to a mechanism designer, and is in fact a
strict subset of the class of mechanisms for which we proved the optimal implementation result.
We leave open the question of whether there is some alternative mechanism that would result in a
unique equilibrium that implements the optimal outcome. Nonetheless, this result indicates that
asymmetric equilibria remain a distinct possibility under a broad class of mechanisms corresponding
to those most commonly used in practice.
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4 Endogenous Effort
The implementability result in Theorem 3.3 was for the homogeneous effort model where all agents
incur the same cost cC for contributing, as might be the case in expertise-based Q&A forums
where the cost to answering is primarily the effort of transcribing one’s knowledge. However, there
are other settings where a contributor might be able to significantly increase the quality of her
contribution by putting in more effort, as in research or effort-intensive questions, such as those
on StackOverflow which request code to accomplish a task. Suppose that in addition to making
strategic decisions about whether or not to contribute, an agent can also make strategic decisions
about how much effort to exert on her contribution. In this section, we investigate the question
of whether contests MB(pB , pC) are still adequate to implement optimal outcomes in such an
endogenous effort model where agents can strategically choose their effort or cost.
As before, to address the question of implementability, we must first answer the question of
whether an equilibrium exists, and understand the form of equilibria. We begin with the following
result.
Theorem 4.1. There exists an equilibrium in which all agents use a symmetric threshold partic-
ipation strategy where an agent participates if and only if her ability is greater than a common
threshold a∗, and conditional on participating, each agent chooses an effort level using a symmetric
strategy that is a function of her ability ai.
Proof. First note that each agent’s expected payoff from participating is nondecreasing in a because
for any given level of effort e, the quality of the agent’s contribution only increases with an increase in
her ability a, and so her expected payoff from participating is at least as large as when participating
with the lower ability. From this it follows that, regardless of the strategies the other agents are
using, each agent has a best response which involves a threshold a∗ such that the agent participates
if and only if the agent’s ability a ≥ a∗.
Now restrict attention to the set of strategies in which each agent i chooses a cutoff a∗i such
that the agent contributes if and only if ai ≥ a
∗
i and chooses effort strategies ei(a) for each a such
that she contributes according to the (possibly random) effort given by ei(a) if she draws ability a.
Note that each individual’s strategy space is compact: each possible choice variable for the agent
is a number in the interval [0, 1], which is compact, so we know from Tychonoff’s Theorem that
the strategy space, a product of compact spaces, is compact. The strategy space is also Hausdorff.
Also note that the strategies and payoffs in this game are symmetric and each player’s payoff is
continuous in the strategies of the other players. Thus from [4], it follows that there exists a
symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium to this game, and the result follows.
Next we address the nature of the strategies that will maximize the mechanism designer’s utility.
As before, we restrict attention to symmetric strategies and discuss which subset of these symmetric
strategies optimize the mechanism designer’s utility. Again, we find that V is maximized when only
agents with abilities above a certain threshold participate; in addition, every such participating
agent must exert the maximum possible effort.
Theorem 4.2. There exists some aˆ ∈ [0, 1] such that the mechanism designer’s utility is maximized
when an agent i participates if and only if ai ≥ aˆ, and each participating agent chooses effort ei = 1.
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Proof. First note that for any fixed participation strategies of the agents, the mechanism designer’s
utility is maximized when all agents choose effort ei = 1 conditional on participating because
choosing effort ei = 1 results in higher quality contributions without changing the distribution of
the number of agents who contribute. Thus the strategy that maximizes the mechanism designer’s
utility is contained in the subset of strategies in which the agents always exert effort ei = 1. But we
know from the reasoning in the proof of Lemma 3.2 that when the agents do not vary their levels
of effort, then there exists some aˆ ∈ [0, 1] such that the mechanism designer’s utility is maximized
if each agent i participates if and only if ai ≥ aˆ. Combining these arguments gives the result.
We are now ready to address the question of whether outcomes that maximize the mecha-
nism designer’s utility can be supported in an equilibrium of the best contribution mechanism
MB(pB , pC) for any values of pB and pC . Recall that when agents have homogeneous costs cC ,
i.e., they cannot endogenously choose their efforts to influence their contribution qualities, it is
always possible to choose pB and pC to implement an optimal outcome. Our first result shows
that in contrast, the best contribution mechanism need not be adequately powerful to incentivize
optimal strategies if agents can endogenously choose their costs or levels of effort— surprisingly,
this inability arises from perfectly ranking contributions’ qualities.
Theorem 4.3. Suppose that the mechanism MB(pB, pC) always ranks contributions perfectly, i.e.,
π(qi, q−i,m) = 1⇔ qi > qj
for all contributing agents j 6= i. Then there is no equilibrium in which agents follow strategies that
maximize the mechanism designer’s utility V for all values of pB and pC .
Proof. Suppose that all other agents are following a strategy that maximizes the mechanism de-
signer’s utility, and consider an agent i with ability ai = aˆ, where aˆ denotes the threshold according
to which agents contribute in this strategy. Note that such an agent will be selected as the winner
if and only if she is the only agent who contributes, because any other agent j who contributes
content has greater ability and exerts effort ej = 1 and therefore has a higher quality. But this
means that agent i’s choice of effort has no effect on the agent’s probability of being selected as the
winner. So if this agent contributes, then it is a best response for her to exert effort ei = 0.
Note that this low effort best response is not an artifact of choosing an agent with ability exactly
equal to the threshold: a similar argument shows that if an agent has ability ai = aˆ + ǫ for some
small ǫ > 0, then her best response cannot be to choose ei = 1. From this it follows that there is
no equilibrium in which all agents with abilities ai ∈ [aˆ, 1] choose ei = 1, i.e., follow strategies that
maximize the mechanism designer’s utility.
Thus if the system can (and chooses to) rank contributions perfectly in decreasing order of
quality, it will fail to create incentives for agents to exert optimal levels of effort in equilibrium.
The intuitive reason behind this result is that when a mechanism ranks contributions perfectly, a
contributor with low ability ai knows that she has no chance of being ranked ahead of higher ability
contributors (when they also exert high effort) regardless of how much effort she exerts, since q(a, e)
is increasing in both a and e. So she has no incentive to expend effort to try to improve the quality
of her contribution, and it is not an equilibrium for contributors to exert the maximal level of effort
as required to optimize the mechanism designer’s utility.
However, our next result shows that while perfect rankings of the contributions always create
incentives for agents to avoid exerting the optimal level of effort, these adverse incentives can be
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avoided if the system does not rank the contributions perfectly in order of their qualities, for example
by perturbing the rankings by adding random noise to q(ai, ei). With such noisy rankings, exerting
extra effort can always increase the probability that a contributor will ultimately be (possibly
erroneously) ranked ahead of other participants and be selected as the best contribution, giving
agents a greater incentive to exert effort than when qualities of contributions are measured perfectly.
In particular, the mechanism designer may then be able to induce agents to follow strategies that
maximize the mechanism designer’s utility if the cost of effort c(e) does not grow too rapidly, as
the following theorem illustrates.
Theorem 4.4. Consider any pR ≥ 0 and any particular ratio of the rewards pB/pC > 1. Suppose
that
c′(ei) ≤
∂qi
∂ei
∂π
∂qi
(pB − pC)(1 − F (aˆ)
n−1)
for all ei, ai, q−i and m ≥ 2 when pB = c(0) and aˆ denotes the optimal threshold in equilibrium.
Then the mechanism designer can choose the values of pB and pC such that it is an equilibrium for
agents to follow strategies that maximize the mechanism designer’s utility.
Proof. Consider agent i, and suppose at least one other agent makes a contribution. The benefit
bi(qi, q−i) to i from contributing is
bi(qi, q−i) = π(qi, q−i)pB + (1− π(qi, q−i))pC .
So the marginal benefit to agent i from exerting greater effort when at least one other agent
contributes is
∂bi
∂ei
=
∂qi
∂ei
∂π
∂qi
(pB − pC).
Now if agents follow strategies in which they contribute if and only if ai ≥ a
∗ for some a∗ ∈ [0, aˆ],
then the probability at least one other agent contributes is greater than or equal to 1 − F (aˆ)n−1.
Thus the expected marginal benefit to agent i from exerting greater effort if all other agents
follow strategies in which they contribute if and only if ai ≥ a
∗ for some a∗ ∈ [0, aˆ] is at least
∂qi
∂ei
∂pi
∂qi
(pB − pC)(1− F (aˆ)
n−1).
Now if pB ≥ c(0), then for any fixed pB/pC > 1, pB − pC is minimized when pB assumes the
minimum possible value in this range, c(0). So if
c′(ei) ≤
∂qi
∂ei
∂π
∂qi
(pB − pC)(1 − F (aˆ)
n−1)
when pB = c(0), then c
′(ei) ≤
∂qi
∂ei
∂pi
∂qi
(pB − pC)(1− F (aˆ)
n−1) for all pB ≥ c(0).
Combining these arguments shows that if pB ≥ c(0) and all agents follow strategies in which they
contribute if and only if ai ≥ a
∗ for some a∗ ∈ [0, aˆ], then the expected marginal benefit to agent i
from exerting greater effort is greater than or equal to the value of ∂qi
∂ei
∂pi
∂qi
(pB − pC)(1 − F (aˆ)
n−1)
when pB = c(0). Thus if c
′(ei) ≤
∂qi
∂ei
∂pi
∂qi
(pB − pC)(1−F (aˆ)
n−1) when pB = c(0), then the marginal
costs from exerting greater effort are no greater than the expected marginal benefits from exerting
greater effort if pB ≥ c(0) and all agents follow strategies in which they contribute if and only if
ai ≥ a
∗ for some a∗ ∈ [0, aˆ]. From this it follows that if pB ≥ c(0) and all agents follow strategies
in which they contribute if and only if ai ≥ a
∗ for some a∗ ∈ [0, aˆ], then any contributing agent has
an incentive to exert effort ei = 1.
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Now consider some pB that is sufficiently large that all agents with abilities ai ≥ a
∗ participate
in equilibrium for some a∗ ∈ [0, aˆ]. Note that this pB satisfies pB > c(0) because when pB = c(0),
no agents participate in equilibrium. Thus for any such pB we know from the previous paragraph
that all agents who contribute exert effort ei = 1. Given that all agents are exerting effort ei = 1,
we also know from the same reasoning in Theorem 3.2 that the threshold a∗ that agents use in
equilibrium varies continuously with pB and pC .
Now let pB denote the smallest value of the points awarded for best answer such that it is an
equilibrium for all agents with abilities ai ≥ a
∗ to participate for some a∗ ∈ [0, aˆ]. We claim that for
such a pB, it is an equilibrium for agents to participate if and only if ai ≥ aˆ. To see this, suppose
by means of contradiction that this is not the equilibrium in this setting. Then we know that there
exists some equilibrium in which agents participate if and only if ai ≥ a
∗ for some a∗ < aˆ and
exert effort ei = 1 conditional on participating. But then from the reasoning used to show that the
threshold a∗ that agents use in equilibrium varies continuously with pB and pC , it follows that for
slightly lower values of pB , it is still an equilibrium for agents to participate if and only if ai ≥ a
∗∗
for some a∗∗ < aˆ and exert effort ei = 1 conditional on participating. This contradicts the fact that
pB is the smallest value of the points awarded for best answer such that it is an equilibrium for all
agents with abilities ai ≥ a
∗ to participate in equilibrium for some a∗ ∈ [0, aˆ], and proves that for
such a pB, it is an equilibrium for agents to participate if and only if ai ≥ aˆ.
But this indicates that for any fixed ratio of the rewards pB/pC , there exists some pB such that
it is an equilibrium for agents to participate if and only if ai ≥ aˆ and exert effort ei = 1 conditional
on participating. The result then follows.
Perfect and noisy rankings. If contributions are ranked perfectly according to their qualities,
then ∂pi
∂qi
= 0 for almost all values of q because incremental changes in qi do not affect the fact that
the highest quality contribution is always chosen as the best. Similarly, if the winning contribution
is chosen completely randomly without regard to the qualities of the contributions, then ∂pi
∂qi
= 0
also holds because qualities have no affect on the rankings. However, if we rank contributions
according to a noisy signal of quality si = qi + ǫi, where ǫi is drawn from some distribution with
adequately large support, then ∂pi
∂qi
> 0 because incremental improvements in qi always increase a
contribution’s probability of being selected as the best answer.
Theorem 4.4 says that if the marginal cost of exerting effort, c′(e), is not too large and the
system does not rank the qualities of the contributions perfectly, so that ∂pi
∂qi
> 0 always holds when
there are at least two contributions, then the values of pB and pC can be chosen so that agents
follow strategies that maximize the mechanism designer’s utility in an equilibrium ofMB(pB , pC).
We note that the condition on the cost function in this result can be weakened to only requiring
the inequality in theorem statement to hold for pB = c(0)+max{pR− cR, 0}; we choose the current
statement for simplicity and to be obviously applicable irrespective of whether the system allows
rating or not.
Together, Theorems 4.3 and 4.4 suggest that a system that does not rank contributions perfectly
(of course, the ranking must still remain monotone in quality) may induce better outcomes than a
system that does perfectly rank contributions, because such perturbed rankings can create incen-
tives for agents to exert greater effort. While our results require a condition that the cost function
does not grow too rapidly, and therefore do not necessarily imply this will hold under full generality,
they do indicate that the designer may wish to intentionally induce noise in these rankings when
the marginal cost of effort is not too large to allow implementation of optimal outcomes.
We note that this reasoning, indicating that it can be better for a mechanism designer not to
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have precise information about the qualities of contributions, parallels a result in [2] showing that
a firm may find it beneficial not to perfectly monitor its workers if it wants to create incentives
for its employees to work hard. [2] finds that with perfect monitoring, the higher ability workers
will always do better than the lower ability workers, and employees will have no incentive to work
harder than necessary to maintain their position. However, if a firm does not monitor its workers
perfectly, then employees have an incentive to work hard because extra effort can always increase
the probability that they will ultimately be (possibly erroneously) ranked ahead of their coworkers.
5 Discussion
In this paper, we analyzed the effectiveness of the widely used best contribution mechanism at
implementing optimal outcomes, i.e., at inducing selfish agents to choose strategies that achieve
the maximum utility the mechanism designer could obtain if agents were nonstrategic. We
conclude by discussing the robustness of our results to the assumption that users are homogeneous
in their motivations to contribute. While most users may be well-described by the strategic
incentives in our model, there may also be users who contribute non-strategically, without regard
to any gain of points (as an example, there might be heavily invested users who always supply
high quality answers for topics they care about, without regard to point-based incentives). Such
contributors can be modeled as nonstrategic agents whose participation choices and qualities
are exogenous. Our results about when optimal implementation can be achieved all continue
to hold in this case, using similar arguments. For instance, in the case of homogenous effort,
strategic agents would continue to follow symmetric threshold strategies in equilibrium (the specific
thresholds would depend on the distribution of the qualities of the non-strategic agents), and the
equilibrium threshold would again vary continuously with the rewards pB and pC . The mechanism
designer would continue to want the strategic agents to use some symmetric threshold strategy
in equilibrium (again, the value of the desired threshold might depend on the distribution of the
nonstrategic agents’ qualities). The same argument as in Theorem 3.3 would then show that the
mechanism designer could achieve optimal outcomes by choosing rewards appropriately.
Acknowledgments. We thank Preston McAfee and David Pennock for helpful discussions.
References
[1] N. Archak, A. Sundarajan, Optimal Design of Crowdsourcing Contests, International Conference on
Information Sysytems (ICIS), 2009.
[2] R.J. Akerlof, R.T. Holden, Ignorance is Bliss? Why Firms May Not Want to Monitor Their Workers,
Working Paper, Harvard University, 2005.
[3] R.J. Akerlof, R.T. Holden, The Nature of Tournaments, Economic Theory (forthcoming).
[4] J.G. Becker, D.S. Damianov, On the Existence of Symmetric Mixed Strategy Equilibria, Economics
Letters, 90(1), 84-87, 2006.
[5] S. Chawla, J.D. Hartline, B. Sivan, Optimal Crowdsourcing Contests, Working Paper, University of
Wisconsin-Madison, 2011.
19
[6] Y. Chen, S. Jain, D. Parkes, Designing Incentives for Online Question and Answer Forums, ACM
Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), 2009.
[7] A. Glazer, R. Hassim, Optimal Contests, Economic Inquiry, 26(1), 133-143, 1988.
[8] A. Ghosh, R. P. McAfee, Crowdsourcing with Endogenous Entry, Working paper, 2011.
[9] V. Krishna, J. Morgan, The Winner-Take-All Principle in Small Tournaments, Advances in Applied
Economics Vol. 7 (M. Baye, ed.) JAI Press, Stamford, 1998.
[10] D.B. Minor, Increasing Effort Through Softening Incentives in Contests, Working Paper, University of
California, Berkeley, 2011.
[11] B. Moldovanu, A. Sela, Contest Architecture, Journal of Economic Theory, 126(1), 70-96, 2006.
[12] B. Moldovanu, A. Sela, The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests, American Economic Review,
91(3), 542-558, 2001.
[13] K.K. Nam, M.S. Ackerman, L.A. Adamic, Questions in, Knowledge iN? A Study of Naver’s Question
Answering Community, ACM Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI), 2009.
[14] C.R. Taylor, Digging for Golden Carrots: An Analysis of Research Tournaments, American Economic
Review, 85(4), 872-890, 1995.
[15] J. Yang, X. Wei, Seeking and Offering Expertise Across Categories: A Sustainable Mechanism Works
for Baidu Knows, International AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social Media (ICWSM), 2009.
[16] J. Yang, M.S. Ackerman, L.A. Adamic, Virtual Gifts and Guanxi: Supporting Social Exchange in a
Chinese Online Community, ACM Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW),
2011.
20
A Comparative Statics and Learning
In this section, we outline how the mechanism designer would want to set the values of the rewards
pB and pC so that it is an equilibrium for agents to follow strategies that maximize the mechanism
designer’s utility. Throughout this section, we focus on the homogenous effort model.
Comparative Statics First we discuss comparative statics, namely how the values of pB and
pC that must be used to induce the optimal outcome vary as a function of the number of agents,
n. Such results are relevant because some types of questions differ systematically in the number
of agents that arrive: for example, popular topics of general interest in Yahoo! Answers, such as
entertainment, typically attract a lot of agents, while more specialized topics, such as theoretical
physics, attract fewer agents. While there are no general comparative statics results when the
mechanism designer’s utility V can vary with the number of contributions in an arbitrary way,
as we have allowed for in all our results so far, comparative statics results can be obtained for
natural restrictions in the mechanism designer’s utility. Here we consider what happens when aˆ(n),
the ideal threshold that the mechanism designer would like the agents to use, is independent of
n. This setting arises naturally, for instance, if the mechanism designer would like all agents with
adequately high abilities to contribute, but not the remaining agents. We obtain the following
result.
Proposition A.1. Suppose aˆ(n) ∈ (0, 1) is independent of n. For any fixed pR and any fixed ratio
pB/pC > 1, the numbers of points the mechanism designer should award as a function of n, pB(n)
and pC(n), are strictly increasing in n.
Proof. To induce agents to use a threshold strategy aˆ(n) ∈ (0, 1), the values of pB and pC must
be such that u∆(pB , pC , a, n) ≡ (pR − cR)Pr(C>0|a, n) − (pB − cC)Pr(W|a, n) − (pC − cC)[1 −
Pr(W|a, n)] = 0 when a = aˆ(n). Now u∆(pB , pC , a, n) is strictly decreasing in pB and pC when
a = aˆ(n) ∈ (0, 1). Also, u∆(pB, pC , a, n) is strictly increasing in n for any fixed a = aˆ(n) ∈ (0, 1)
because Pr(C>0|a, n) is strictly increasing in n and Pr(W|a, n) is strictly decreasing in n for any
fixed a = aˆ(n) ∈ (0, 1). So the numbers of points the mechanism designer should award for
contributions as a function of n, pB(n) and pC(n), are strictly increasing in n.
We note that the result in Proposition A.1 holds under more general assumptions than that
aˆ(n) is independent of n. As long as aˆ(n) is nonincreasing in n, and the mechanism designer wants
to induce at least as large a rate of participation when there are more agents, then he will still
want to award points in such a way that agents will have a greater incentive to contribute when
there are a larger number of agents. Thus the result in Theorem A.1 continues to hold if aˆ(n) is
nonincreasing in n.
Learning the Parameter Values We have assumed so far that the mechanism designer knows
the agents’ costs for contributing and rating, cC and cR, which are used to determine the rewards
pB and pC that induce agents to use optimal strategies. While it is reasonable to assume that
agents know their own preferences over actions, and in particular that agents know how costly it
is for them to contribute or rate, it may not always be reasonable to assume that the mechanism
designer knows these costs as well. In this section, we illustrate how a mechanism designer may
learn the agents’ costs by observing their behavior.
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We first consider a scenario in which the mechanism designer knows the value of cR but does
not know the precise value of cC . The assumption that the mechanism designer knows the value of
cR is reasonable in many settings because there are many contexts in which rating content takes
almost no effort at all, i.e., cR = 0. We will later illustrate how values may be learned when the
mechanism designer also does not know the value of cR.
We assume throughout that the mechanism designer only knows that cC ∈ (0, c) for some
c ∈ (0,∞); thus there is some upper bound on the maximum possible cost an agent could incur
from contributing content. The agents know how costly it is for them to contribute content, so if
the mechanism designer awards pB points for winning, pC points for contributing but not winning,
and pR points for rating, then the agents play according to the same equilibrium strategies given
in §3.1. In particular, agents use a threshold a∗(cC), which is the unique symmetric equilibrium
that agents can use when their cost for contributing is cC .
Suppose the mechanism designer conducts a series of T contests, where he awards pB points
for winning, pC points for contributing but not winning, and pR points for rating in each contest.
We let ntC denote the number of agents who contribute content in the t
th contest and suppose that
the number of agents n in each contest is the same for all contests t. We have the following easy
lemma.
Lemma A.1. If the mechanism designer conducts a series of T contests with n agents in which
the mechanism designer awards the same numbers of points in all contests, then
∑T
t=1 n
t
C/(Tn)
converges in probability to 1− F (a∗(cC)) as T →∞.
Proof. By the law of large numbers,
∑T
t=1 n
t
C/(Tn) converges in probability to the probability that
an agent contributes content in equilibrium as T →∞. This probability is 1− F (a∗(cC)).
This result guarantees that the mechanism designer can learn the frequency with which agents
contribute content, 1−F (a∗(cC)), by conducting a large number of contests in which the mechanism
designer awards the same numbers of points in each contest. From this the mechanism designer
can immediately learn the threshold a∗(cC) that agents are using in equilibrium when there are
pB points for winning, pC points for contributing but not winning, and pR points for rating. This
in turn implies that if there is a one-to-one correspondence between values of cC and values of
a∗(cC), then the mechanism designer can learn the value of cC by conducting the series of contests
described above. We now address when there is a one-to-one correspondence between values of cC
and values of a∗(cC).
Lemma A.2. a∗(cC) is strictly increasing in cC for values of cC satisfying a
∗(cC) ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. Note that if a∗(cC) ∈ (0, 1), then a
∗(cC) is the value of a that satisfies the equation
u∆(cC , a) ≡ (pR − cR)Pr(C>0|a) − (pB − cC)Pr(W|a) − (pC − cC)[1 − Pr(W|a)] = 0. Now we
have seen that u∆ is strictly decreasing in a. Also, from the above expression, it follows that
u∆(cC , a) is strictly increasing in cC . From this it follows that the value of a that satisfies the
equation u∆(cC , a) = 0 is strictly increasing in cC for values of cC satisfying a
∗(cC) ∈ (0, 1).
By combining these two lemmas, we obtain the main result of this section.
Theorem A.1. If the mechanism designer conducts a series of T contests with n agents in which
the mechanism designer awards pB > pR + c points for winning and pC = 0 points for contributing
but not winning, then
∑T
t=1 n
t
C/(Tn) converges in probability to an invertible function of cC as
T →∞.
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Proof. From the previous two lemmas, we know that if a∗(cC) ∈ (0, 1) always holds, then∑T
t=1 n
t
C/(Tn) converges in probability to an invertible function of cC as T → ∞. But if pC = 0
and pB > pR+ c, then pB− cC > pR− cR > pC − cC necessarily holds. We have already seen that if
pB− cC > pR− cR > pC − cC , then the agents play according to a symmetric threshold equilibrium
with threshold a∗ ∈ (0, 1). Thus if pC = 0 and pB > pR + c, then
∑T
t=1 n
t
C/(Tn) converges in
probability to an invertible function of cC as T →∞.
Thus the mechanism designer can use the series of contests described above to infer how costly
it is for agents to contribute content with arbitrary precision in the limit of a large number of
contests, and deduce the optimal levels of points necessary to induce the agents to follow strategies
that maximize his utility. We note that it is not necessary to observe how agents react to a large
number of different rewards in order to learn the optimal values of pB and pC for a given population.
The mechanism designer can simply award a constant level of points for a long time, observe how
agents react to this, and then use this information to deduce the optimal values for pB and pC .
Thus this method of learning the optimal rewards is one that can be easily implemented in practice.
The learning result in this section has made use of the assumption that the mechanism designer
knows cR. When cR is not known, there may be multiple values of cC and cR that would result in
the agents using a given threshold for a particular value of pB . However, the mechanism designer
could learn the values of cC and cR by conducting an additional experiment similar to that in
Theorem A.1, but with a larger number of points for winning, i.e., a larger value of pB. The
agents will use different thresholds in these two different contests, and the mechanism designer
could use the learned values of these thresholds to obtain two non-degenerate linear equations for
the unknowns cC and cR that uniquely determine the values of these costs. Thus if cC and cR are
not known, the mechanism designer can learn the values of these parameters by conducting two
separate experiments of the form in Theorem A.1 with different levels of points for winning.
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